COMMENTS
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING:
THE MOUNT LAUREL DOCTRINE AND
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE MADISON TOWNSHIP CASE
Ostensibly, the purpose behind the enactment of any zoning
ordinance is to regulate the use of the land within a particular
jurisdiction. 1 In New Jersey, the judicial responses to zoning have
evolved from outright disapproval, 2 through presumed validity, 3 to
'See generally D. MANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA 2-4 (1971); 1 N. WILLIAMS,
AMERICAN PLANNING LAW, LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER §§ 16.01-.14 (1974); 1
E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 1-10 to -15 (3d ed. 1965); Anderson, Introduction to Symposium on Exclusionary Zoning, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 465, 465-67
(1971); see also D. MOSKOWITZ,

EXCLUSIONARY ZONING LITIGATION 5-9 (1977) (al-

though the theory behind zoning is the imposition of a comprehensive land use plan, in
reality zoning ordinances are enacted to slow municipal growth and prevent continued
development).
2 See Stein v. City of Long Branch, 2 N.J. Misc. 121 (Sup. Ct. 1924). The facts of the
case were that a realtor desired to build six bungalows along a strip of beachfront land.
The town attempted to prevent this by enacting a zoning ordinance which required that
all buildings within plaintiff's zone be on lots of 150 by 250 feet, be two and one-half
stories high, and sell for a minimum of $15,000. Id. at 122. The court unequivocally
stated that "the restrictive provisions of the zoning ordinance ... are clearly unreasonable, and, therefore, unconstitutional." Id. at 123.
Professor Williams characterizes the New Jersey posture toward zoning as hostile in
this first stage. I N. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, § 6.04.
3 See, e.g., Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693
(1952), appeal dismissed per curiam, 344 U.S. 919 (1953). In an opinion written by
Chief Justice Vanderbilt, the court upheld an ordinance which contained severe
minimum requirements on dwelling size. 10 N.J. at 167-69, 89 A.2d at 694-95. The
court stated that there was no doubt that the municipality could impose minimum floor
space requirements, id. at 171, 89 A.2d at 696, and that those enacted in this situation
were reasonable since they promoted the general welfare of the community, id. at
174-75, 89 A.2d at 697-98. The court drew its rationale from the language in three
previous cases: Schmidt v. Board of Adjustment, 9 N.J. 405, 422, 88 A.2d 607, 615 (1952)
(local zoning ordinances will be upheld so long as they bear a reasonable relation to the
general welfare); Duffcon Concrete Prods. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 513, 64
A.2d 347, 349-50 (1949) (the most appropriate use of land within a municipality depends,
in large part, on the characteristics of that municipality); and Brookdale Homes, Inc. v.
Johnson, 126 N.J.L. 516, 524, 19 A.2d 868, 872 (Ct. Err. & App. 1941) (dissenting opinion
urged that zoning ordinances should be upheld if they allocate land "to the uses best
suited to the good of the community" (emphasis added)). 10 N.J. at 171-75, 89 A.2d at
696-98. The thrust of the cited portions of these cases is that a zoning ordinance is entitled to a presumption of validity as long as it reasonably promotes the general welfare
of the particular municipality.
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strict scrutiny in order to insure compatability with regional needs. 4
Initially, the Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected attempts to restrict the uses of property by municipalities. 5 However, as large areas
of the state began to develop and to acquire identifiable characteristics, the court adopted the view that there should be a strong pre6
sumption in favor of the validity of a municipality's zoning ordinances.
As haphazard, sprawling land use continued, the court became aware
of the intense competition among municipalities to attract tax ratables
and of the collateral tendency to attempt to exclude, through zoning,
lower income groups. This precipitated the realization that regional

7
needs must take precedence over local preferences.
The result of this growing sentiment was the pivotal decision of

Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel.8

Subsequently, the court offered a more detailed explanation of its
approach to the available remedies for exclusionary zoning in Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison. 9 The combined impact of these decisions has signaled a reversal of the court's previous
The opinion in the Wayne Township case has been severely criticized for lack of
careful analysis and for "evincing extreme judicial abnegation." Haar, Zoning for
Mininmuin Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1051, 1051-53
(1953).
4 See Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J, 481, 371 A.2d
1192 (1977); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
- See, e.g., Brookdale Homes, Inc. v. Johnson, 126 N.J.L. 516, 19 A.2d 868 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1941) aff'g, 123 N.J.L. 602, 10 A.2d 477 (Sup. Ct. 1940). In this case the court
affirmed, per curiam, the lower court's decision that the enactment of a zoning ordinance allowing only single family detached houses was ultra vires the municipality. The
dissent argued that this type of regulation should be permitted where it reasonably
promoted valid municipal goals. 126 N.J.L. at 521, 19 A.2d at 870 (Heher, J., dissenting).
6 See Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952); Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal dismissed
per curiam, 344 U.S. 919 (1953). In the Fischer case, the court went so far as to approve
a zoning ordinance establishing residential zones of either one-half or five acre lots. 11

N.J. at 198-99, 93 A.2d at 380. It was concluded that such zoning helped preserve the
rural character of the community while maintaining property values. Id. at 205, 93 A.2d
at 384.
7 See Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d
1192 (1977); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); 1 N.
WILLIAMS, supra note 1, § 6.04; 3 id. § 66.13f (Addendum 1975). See also Williams &
Norman, Exclusionary Land Use Controls: The Case of North-Eastern New Jersey, 22
SYRACUSE L. REV. 475, 498-502 (1971).

8 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. deniied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
9 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977). Subsequent to the inception of this litigation,
the Township of Madison changed its name to Old Bridge. Id. at 491 n.1, 371 A.2d at
1196.
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laissez faire approach to the validity of local zoning practices. 10 In
Mount Laurel, the court assumed an activist role in dealing with the
problem of exclusionary zoning by announcing a new principle which
placed an affirmative obligation on municipalities to encourage economically balanced communities." In the Madison Township case,
the court attempted to make the policy goals enunciated in Mount
Laurel realistically attainable by effecting a tactical retreat from the
expansive language of that decision.' 2 This Comment will examine
the current status of the New Jersey supreme court's revolutionary
approach to exclusionary zoning. 3
THE MOUNT LAUREL DOCTRINE

The decision in Mount Laurel has been hailed as one of the most
significant advances in zoning law in the past five decades. 14 In that
case, the New Jersey supreme court abandoned its previous policy of
holding that a municipality's zoning ordinances were entitled to a
presumption of validity 15 and that the promotion of the general welfare of the individual municipality was the sole legitimate goal of such
ordinances. 16 The case arose as a class action on behalf of minority
10 See 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, § 6.04.
1 See 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724-25.
12 See 72 N.J. at 498-501, 510-14, 524-44, 371 A.2d at 1200-01, 1206-08, 1216-23.
13 The most controversial aspect of exclusionary zoning litigation concerns the effectiveness, extent and advisability of judicial remedies. See generally Mallach, Do Lawsuits Build Housing?: The Implications of Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, 6 RUT.-CAM.
L.J. 653 (1975); Mytelka & Mytelka, Exclusionary Zoning: A Considerationof Remedies,
7 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1975); Rose, The Mount Laurel Decision: Is It Based on Wishful Thinking?, 4 REAL ESTATE L.J. 61 (1975); Note, The Inadequacy of Judicial Remedies in Cases of Exclusionary Zoning, 74 MICH. L. REv. 760 (1976); Note, A Wrong
Without A Remedy: Judicial Approaches to Exclusionary Zoning, 6 RUT.-CAM. L.J.
727 (1975).
14 See, e.g., 3 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, § 66.13b (Addendum 1975); Williams &
Doughty, Studies in Legal Realism: Mount Laurel, Belle Terre and Berman, 29
RUTGERS L. REv. 73, 94 (1975) (suggestion that Mount Laurel surpasses in importance
the landmark zoning case Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)).
It was in Euclid that the practice of zoning was held to be constitutional. Id. at 386-90.
15 67 N.J. at 176-77, 336 A.2d at 726.
16 Compare id. at 188-91, 336 A.2d at 732-33 with Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 11 N.J. 194, 202-05, 93 A.2d 378, 382-84 (1952) and Lionshead Lake, Inc. v.
Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 174-76, 89 A.2d 693, 697-98 (1952), appeal dismissed
per curiam, 344 U.S. 919 (1953).
Interestingly, it was somewhat by chance that the Mount Laurel case, rather than
the Madison Township case became the vehicle for the court's new doctrine. At least
one commentator felt that the court would utilize the Madison Township case to announce its policy. 3 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, § 66.10. Both cases had been granted
certification after trial court decisions had invalidated the townships' zoning ordinances.
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 119 N.J. Super. 164,
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poor living in and around Mount Laurel, who claimed that the effect
of the township's zoning ordinance was to exclude themr from residing
in that community.17

The decision rendered in Mount Laurel was significant not
merely for the fact that it announced a new judicial approach to land
use regulation, but for the novel way in which the court fiamed the
issue.' 8 Justice Hall, writing for the court, made it clear that the

290 A.2d 465 (Law Div.), cert. granted, 62 N.J. 190, 299 A.2d 724 (1972); Oakwood at
Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (Law Div.),
cert. granted, 62 N.J. 185, 299 A.2d 720 (1971). The cases were then initially heard
together by the supreme court in March 1973. See 3 N. WILLIAMS, supra § 66.12 (Addendum 1975). A reargument was scheduled for January 1974. Professor Williams suggests
that this may have been due to the fact that several justices were retiring; thus, a new
court would be responsible for implementing any decision reached. Id. However, b%
this time, Madison had substantially amended its "invalid" zoning ordinance and that
case had to be remanded for a new trial to determine the validity of the amended ordinance. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d
383 (Law Div.), cert. granted, 62 N.J. 185, 299 A.2d 720 (1971), on remand, 128 N.J.
Super. 438, 320 A.2d 223 (Law Div. 1974).
As a result of these circumstances, the important policy decided became known as
the Mount Laurel doctrine. This doctrine, as reflected in the holding of the case, is that
each developing
municipality must, by its land use regulations, presumptively make realistically
possible an appropriate variety and choice of housing. More specifically, presumptively it cannot foreclose the opportunity ... for low and moderate income
housing and in its regulations must affirmatively afford that opportunity, at least
to the extent of the municipality's fair share of the present and prospective
regional need therefor.
67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724.
For a discussion of this doctrine, see generally D. MOSKOWVITZ, supra note 1, at
225-45; Ackerman, The AMount Laurel Decision: Expanding the Boundaries of Zoning
Reform, 1976 U. ILL. L. FORUM 1; Rohan, Property Planing and the Search for a
Comprehensitve Housing Policy-The View from Mount Laurel, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REXV.
653 (1975); Rose, supra note 13; Williams & Doughty, supra note 14; Comment,
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel: Municipalities
Must Zone to Provide a Fair Share of Regional Housing Needs, 5 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 203 (1975).
1767 N.J. at 159 & n.3, 336 A.2d at 717. Though the court was aware of the fact that
the particular plaintiffs were, in fact, predominantly black and hispanic poor, Justice
Hall specifically noted that the exclusionary effects of the ordinance operated on the
much broader category of economically less advantaged persons. This included the elderly, the voting, unmarried persons and those with growing families. Id.
18 Id. at 173, 336 A.2d at 724. Whereas, in previous cases, the issue was whether
the zoning ordinance reasonably promoted the general welfare of the township, see, e.g.,
Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952) and Lionshead
Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal dismissed per
curiam, 344 U.S. 919 (1953), the Mount Laurel court took the issue to be whether any
municipality could, by its zoning ordinance, practice economic discrimination. See 67
N.J. at 173, 336 A.2d at 724. Without such a rephrasing of the issue, the significance of
the exclusionary zoning problem may have been overlooked.
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zoning ordinance would be judged solely on its exclusionary effect
upon those seeking low and moderate income housing. 19 Thus, the
issue was one of economic discrimination only: whether a developing
municipality could effectively exclude low and moderate income persons from residency within its boundaries by means of a system of
land use regulation which would make the construction of low and
20
moderate income housing "physically and economically impossible."
19See 67 N.J. at 173, 336 A.2d at 724. The court had also pointed out, earlier in the
opinion, that the impact of this "issue ...is not confined to Mount Laurel." Id. at 160,
336 A.2d at 717.
20 Id. at 173, 336 A.2d at 724. The examination of Mount Laurel as a developing
municipality is an important aspect of the opinion, especially since two recent cases
have made it clear that the Alount Laurel doctrine does not apply to municipalities
which cannot be characterized as developing. Fobe Assoc. v. Mayor & Council of Demarest, 74 N.J. 519, 379 A.2d 31 (1977); Pascack Ass'n, Ltd. v. Mayor & Council of Township of Washington, 74 N.J. 470, 379 A.2d 6 (1977).
Mount Laurel was found to be "a part of the outer ring of the South Jersey metropolitan area." 67 N.J. at 162, 336 A.2d at 718. The town had experienced an extraordinary increase in population in the last two decades. The 1950 population of 2,817 had
nearly doubled by 1960 to 5,249. This figure also more than doubled by 1970 to a total
of 11,221. Id. at 161, 336 A.2d at 718. During the decade from 1960 to 1970, Mount
Laurel's population density increased from 238.0 to 506.6 per square mile. NEW JERSEY
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, DIVISION OF STATE AND REGIONAL PLANNING,

NEW JERSEY MUNICIPAL PROFILES INTENSITY OF URBANIZATION 8 (1972). By way of
comparison, the corresponding figures for the nearby city of Camden, clearly not a developing municipality, were 13,466.6 per square mile in 1960 and 11,814.6 in 197 0-a
12.5% decrease in population. Id. at 10.
Despite this fantastic rate of growth, "65% of the township [was] still vacant land or
in agricultural use." 67 N.J. at 162, 336 A.2d at 718. In addition, the excellent highway
system surrounding the township augured well for continuing growth of both population
and job opportunities. Id. at 162-63, 336 A.2d at 718-19. Both the New Jersey Turnpike
and Interstate Highway 295 run through Mount Laurel, and state routes 70, 73 and 38,
as well as U.S. 130, are easily accessible. Id. at 162, 336 A.2d at 718.
The specifics of the challenged ordinance were that it provided four residential
zones, each permitting only detached, one-family homes. Id. at 163, 336 A.2d at 719.
The zones were denominated R-1, R-1ID, R-2 and R-3. Housing development was prominent in the R-1 and R-2 zones, whereas most of the town's substandard housing was
located in the R-3 zone. Id. at 163-64, 336 A.2d at 719-20. The R-1 zone required, inter
alia, building on a lot of no less than 9,375 square feet (slightly less than one-quarter
acre), a minimum dwelling floor area of 1,100 square feet for one story buildings and
1,300 square feet for buildings of one and one-half stories or higher. The R-2 zone
required minimum floor area of only 900 square feet. However, "minimum lot size was
11,000 square feet." Id. at 164, 336 A.2d at 719. The R-3 zone required a minimum lot
size of 20,000 square feet, with floor area requirements as in the R-1 zone. Id., 336 A.2d
at 719-20. The R-ID zone was taken from the R-3 zone with the minimum lot size
reduced to 10,000 square feet. Id. at 165, 336 A.2d at 720. Construction could only be
undertaken, however, so long as the overall dwelling density of the entire zone did not
exceed 2.25 units per acre, or, in effect about one house for each half acre. The houses,
though, would be "clustered" together, with "a minimum of 15% and a maximum of
25% of the total acreage" to be dedicated by the developer to municipal purposes such
as parks, schools or public buildings. Id. at 165, 336 A.2d at 720. For a more thorough
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The court concluded that every developing municipality must take
into consideration the low and moderate income housing needs of the
"region" of which it is a part when drafting its zoning ordinances and
specifically provide for its "fair share" of that regional need. 2 1 Fuldiscussion of this practice, known as cluster zoning, see 2 N.

WILLIAMS,

supra note 1,

§§ 47.01-05.

These minimum lot size and minimum dwelling floor area requirements were
found to have the effect of "allow[ing] only homes within the financial reach of persons
of at least middle income." 67 N.J. at 164, 336 A.2d at 719 (emphasis added). The court
referred to the general categories of low and moderate income guidelines set by the
trial court in Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 128 N.J. Super. 438,
445, 320 A.2d 223, 227 (Law Div. 1974). 67 N.J. at 158 n.2, 336 A.2d at 716. In that
decision, Judge Furman referred to families with incomes up to $7,000 per year as low
income and those with incomes from $10,000 to $12,000 per year as being in the moderate income category. 128 N.J. Super. at 445 & n.3, 320 A.2d at 227. The Mount Laurel
court cites these figures approvingly and classifies middle and upper income as simply
"designations of higher income categories." 67 N.J. at 158 n.2, 336 A.2d at 716.
It was not until late 1971 that Mount Laurel had approved some multi-family housing projects. Id. at 166, 336 A.2d at 720-21. The township had authorized planned unit
development (PUD) zones in late 1967. Id., 336 A.2d at 721. The PUD concept stresses
regulation of density rather than lot size and floor area. Thus, a developer may arrange
with the township to construct a variety of housing units and other structures for a
variety of uses on a particular tract of land, so long as the density of that area is within
the established limit. This permits a mixture of such uses including single-family
dwellings (both attached and detached), garden apartments, high rise apartments,
town houses, and possibly some commercial structures. Id., 336 A.2d at 720-21. For a
general discussion of the PUD concept, see 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra §§ 48.01-.12. Mount
Laurel's zoning ordinance permitting PUDs was repealed in 1971, in the midst of a legal
challenge to its validity. 67 N.J. at 166 n.5, 336 A.2d at 721; see Rudderow v. Township
Comm. of Mount Laurel, 114 N.J. Super. 104, 274 A.2d 854 (Law Div. 1971), rev'd, 121
N.J. Super. 409, 297 A.2d 583 (App. Div. 1972). Prior to the repeal, the township had
approved four PUD projects; these approvals were not revoked. 67 N.J. at 166, 336 A.2d
at 721.
The supreme court found that these projects, too, were approved expressly to attract
"only persons of medium and upper income." Id. at 167, 336 A.2d at 721. The court
found that any housing actually constructed in the PUD sites would be "beyond the
financial reach of low and moderate income families, especially those with voung children." Id. This was due to the limitation on the number of one-bedroom units, and
certain cost-generating features of the ordinance. For example, developers would be
required to pay school costs in the event that the number of school children per multifamily development exceeded .3; developers would also be required to provide such
amenities as central air conditioning and to contribute to fire protection and ambulance
services. All of these exactions would inevitably inflate the ultimate rental amount. Id.
at 168, 336 A.2d at 721-22.
21 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724. The motivation for exclusionary land use regulation was rooted in the township's desire to maintain an acceptable tax structure within
the municipality, i.e., to keep the demand for services stable while increasing the
number of people and dwelling units which would add favorably to the tax base. Id. at
170-71, 336 A.2d at 723. Obviously, low and moderate income families would contribute negatively to this fiscal goal, since their need for services would surpass their ability
to pay for them through property taxes. See id. at 171-73, 336 A.2d at 723-24.
Basically, the town, if successful in this zoning effort, would have been able to
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fillment of this obligation was labeled a presumptive purpose for zoning, and any municipality attempting to avoid it would be required to
meet a heavy burden of showing special circumstances which would
22
relieve it of this obligation.
remain a desirable enclave for upper income groups in the midst of a rapidly developing region, while avoiding any share of the costs of this development in the form of
higher property taxes needed to pay for schools and social services. See id. at 195, 336
A.2d at 736 (Pashman, J., concurring). This attempt to use zoning regulations to control
fiscal burdens was totally rejected by the court. See notes 38-41 infra and accompanying
text; Ackerman, supra note 16, at 17 n.84. The court found "the basic importance of the
opportunity for appropriate housing for all classes of our citizenry" to be the overriding
concern. 67 N.J. at 186, 336 A.2d at 731.
22 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724. Intent to exclude those of a particular class need
not be shown, so long as the effect of the ordinance is to exclude them. Id. at 174 &
n.10, 336 A.2d at 724-25. There may be some room to argue this point, since in the
Madison Township case, courts were directed to examine both the substance of the
challenged ordinance and the bona fide efforts toward eliminating obstacles to low cost
housing. See 72 N.J. at 499, 371 A.2d at 1200; notes 144-46 infra and accompanying
text.
The court's holding was based solely on state constitutional grounds, 67 N.J. at 174,
336 A.2d at 725, effectively precluding review by the Supreme Court. D. MOSKOWITZ,
supra note 1, at 236; see 3 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, § 66.13b (Addendum 1975). This
also precludes legislative override, and is so stated by the Madison Township court. 72
N.J. at 496, 371 A.2d at 1199; see D. MOSKOWITZ, supra at 236. Moskowitz points out
that one reason to avoid basing the decision on federal constitutional grounds is to prevent the possibility of an adverse decision by the Supreme Court. He further notes that
the Mount Laurel decision is based primarily on economic discrimination and not racial
discrimination. Id. at 66. He then suggests that a challenge to a zoning ordinance solely
on economic grounds would not succeed in federal court since discrimination on the
basis of wealth has not yet been clearly established as a suspect classification under the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 101-05. For further discussion of the difference in the
federal approach on this point, see Ackerman, supra note 16, at 5-9.
The Mount Laurel court's approach was simply to recognize that land use regulation is within the police power of the state. 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 725. Article IV,
§ VI, 2 of the New Jersey constitution authorizes legislative delegation of the zoning
power to municipalities. The pertinent part of that section of the constitution reads as
follows:
The Legislature may enact general laws under which municipalities, other
than counties, may adopt zoning ordinances limiting and restricting to specified
districts and regulating therein, buildings and structures, according to their
construction, and the nature and extent of their use, and the nature and extent
of the uses of land, and the exercise of such authority shall be deemed to be
within the police power of the State.
The constitution further requires that all action taken pursuant to the state's police
power conform to the requirements of due process and equal protection. The section of
the New Jersey constitution interpreted as requiring equal protection and due process
is art. I,
1, which reads as follows:
All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural
and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life
and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing
and obtaining safety and happiness.
See 67 N.J. at 174-75, 336 A.2d at 725. Therefore, the delegated zoning power, like any
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In previous decisions, the court had tested the validity of zoning
ordinances by determining whether they furthered the "general welfare," a concept which had been equated with the preferences of the
municipality. 23 The Mount Laurel court concluded that the "extreme,

24
long-time need . . . for decent low and moderate income housing"

required that the term "general welfare" be interpreted to encompass
those citizens beyond the municipality's borders who need and desire
such housing. 25 Having found Mount Laurel's ordinance presumptively invalid as failing to promote this expanded concept of general
welfare, 26 the court nevertheless examined the arguments advanced
other police power, must be used to affirmatively promote the general welfare, id. at
174-75, 336 A.2d at 724-25, and this requires that "the welfare of the state's citizens
beyond the borders of the particular municipality cannot be disregarded and must be
recognized and served." Id. at 177, 336 A.2d at 726.
23 See, e.g., Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 11 N.J. 194, 202-05, 93 A.2d 378,
382-84 (1952); Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 171-73, 89
A.2d 693, 696-97 (1952), appeal dismissed per curiam, 344 U.S. 919 (1953). The Mount
Laurel court points out that language in these previous opinions foreshadowed the possibility of a change in approach should circumstances so dictate. 67 N.J. at 176-77, 336
A.2d at 725-26. This warning is most plainly stated in the case of Pierro v. Baxendale,
20 N.J. 17, 118 A.2d 401 (1955). In that case, the court had held valid a zoning ordinance which prohibited hotels and motels from residential districts while permitting
boarding houses. Id. at 19-21, 30, 118 A.2d at 401-03, 408. The court had also acknowledged the criticism of its Wayne Township and Bedminster Township decisions, see
notes 3 and 6 supra, but reiterated its position, that under "existing population and land
conditions" at the time of those decisions, there was no real threat to any particular
class of citizens. Id. at 29, 118 A.2d at 407-08. However, a terse warning was issued: "If
and when conditions change, alterations in zoning restrictions and pertinent legislative
and judicial attitudes need not be long delayed." Id., 118 A.2d at 408.
24 67 N.J. at 179, 336 A.2d at 727. An argument can be made that the New Jersey
supreme court has, in effect, found the right to decent housing to be one of the basic
rights guaranteed under the New Jersey constitution's substantive due process and
equal protection clause, paragraph one of article one. The statement is made in Mount
Laurel that "tilt is plain beyond dispute that proper provision for adequate housing of
all categories of people is certainly an absolute essential in promotion of the general welfare required in all local land use regulation." Id. (emphasis added).
It would seem that if the right to decent housing were not a fundamental one, then
the concept of general welfare would not, as "an absolute essential," encompass that
right. Id. The United States Supreme Court has not, as yet, declared the right to housing
as one of those basic rights protected by the fourteenth amendment.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 180-85, 336 A.2d at 728-30. The fact that the ordinance provided only for
detached one family homes weighed heavily against it. In addition, the cost generating
features in the PUD zone and the minimum lot and floor area requirements in the
residential zones, see note 21 supra, combined to insure that whatever housing could
be constructed would be beyond the reach of those in low and moderate income
categories. 67 N.J. at 182-84, 336 A.2d at 729-30. The court reached the "irresistible"
conclusion that the ordinance would "permi[t] only such middle and upper income
housing as . . . w[ould] have sufficient taxable value to come close to paying its own
governmental way." Id. at 184, 336 A.2d at 730.
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in support of the zoning scheme. 2 7 The township tacitly admitted that
its only purpose in enacting the ordinance was to restrict its future
population to those of a particular financial ilk. 2 It urged that this
type of fiscal zoning was legitimate since it would allow a beneficial
local tax rate.2 9 This contention was emphatically rejected. The court
stated that the fundamentally important concept of having housing
available for all classes of people could not be overridden by an individual municipality's fiscal concerns. 3 0 Thus, the supreme court established that the developing municipality of Mount Laurel, as well as
other municipalities similarly situated, "must zone primarily for the
living welfare of people and not for the benefit of the local tax
rate. "31
Although the Mount Laurel opinion set out broadly based judicial
standards for the evaluation of individual zoning ordinances, the
court's approach to the most controversial area of exclusionary zoning
32
litigation-the fashioning of a remedy-was far more conservative.

67 N.J. at 185-87, 336 A.2d at 730-31.
Id. at 170-71, 336 A.2d at 723.
29 Id. at 185, 336 A.2d at 730-31. The court characterized this argument as basically
that any municipality may zone extensively to seek and encourage the "good"
tax ratables of industry and commerce, and limit the permissible types of housing to those having the fewest school children or to those providing sufficient
value to attain or approach paying their own way taxwise.
Id., 336 A.2d at 731.
30 Id. at 186, 336 A.2d at 731. A previous supreme court decision had held that a
municipality may, through zoning, attempt to attract industrial ratables if it is "done
reasonably as part of and in furtherance of a legitimate comprehensive plan for the
zoning of the entire municipality." Gruber v. Mayor & Tp. Comm. of Raritan, 39 N.J. 1,
9, 186 A.2d 489, 493 (1962). The Mount Laurel court acknowledged that this is still
proper, provided that there are ample residential zones to accommodate the appropriate
variety of housing. 67 N.J. at 185-86, 336 A.2d at 731. The court recognized the problem
of burdensome property taxes, but stated that "relief from the consequences of th[at] tax
system will have to be furnished by other branches of government." Id. at 186, 336 A.2d
at 731.
The township also raised an ecological argument in support of its ordinance, claiming that a lack of sewers or water service in certain areas required large-lot development
in order to assure proper sewage disposal. Id. The justices were not persuaded by this
argument since most of the land in question was "flat . . . and readily amenable to such
utility installations." Id. For environmental issues to have an impact on a town's zoning
ordinance they must be "very real" and not merely "makeweight" arguments. Id. at
186-87, 336 A.2d at 731.
31 67 N.J. at 187-88, 336 A.2d at 731-32. As to what type of municipality might not
be considered to be "developing," see Fobe Assoc. v. Mayor & Council of Demarest, 74
N.J. 519, 379 A.2d 31 (1977); Pascack Ass'n, Ltd. v. Mayor & Council of Township of
Washington, 74 N.J. 470, 379 A.2d 6 (1977).
32 67 N.J. at 191-92, 336 A.2d at 734. Part of the difficulty in constructing judicial
remedies lies in the fact that courts must deal with specific cases and are not at liberty
27
28
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The court did not agree with the trial judge that the entire ordinance
was invalid; 33 therefore, only those aspects of the ordinance inconsistent with the new doctrine were nullified. 3 4 Mount Laurel was given
ninety days to adopt corrective amendments. 3 5 No attempt was made
to impose additional affirmative remedies; rather, the municipality
was given the responsibility initially to provide the opportunity for
the construction of low and moderate income housing by means of
appropriate land use regulations. 36 Thus, the court exhibited a spirit
of trust by allowing the township the "opportunity to itself act
without judicial supervision." 37
Justice Pashman concurred in the opinion, 38 but "would have
[had] the Court go farther and faster in" providing remedies. 39 He
viewed the problem as an abuse of "zoning power to advance the
parochial interests of the municipality at the expense of the surrounding region and to establish and perpetuate social and economic
segregation." 40 In his discussion of the widespread nature of exclusionary zoning in New Jersey, 4 1 Justice Pashman recognized that this
practice assumes many forms. 4 2 He labeled certain restrictions "into impose broadly based solutions, even when confronted with a problem that is clearly
widespread. See notes 137-145 infra and accompanying text; Oakwood at Madison, Inc.
v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 531-36, 371 A.2d 1192, 1216-19 (1977). For a discussion of the appropriateness of legislative remedies, see generally Kleven, Inclusionary Ordinances-Policy and Legal Issues in Requiring Private Developers to Build
Low Cost Housing, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1432, 1433-38 (1974); Mytelka & Mytelka, supra
note 13, at 5-13; Note, State Land Use Regulation-A Survey of Recent Legislative
Approaches, 56 MINN. L. REV. 869 (1972); Note, 74 MICH. L. REV., supra note 13, at
766-86.
3367 N.J. at 191, 336 A.2d at 734.
34 Id.
35 Id. Mount Laurel was given the first opportunity to revise the details of its ordinance, rather than have the court impose revisions. Id.
36 Id. at 192, 336 A.2d at 734.
37 Id. (emphasis added). It should be noted that, as of March 1977, there had been
no low or moderate income housing construction in Mount Laurel Township. Newark
Star-Ledger, Mar. 27, 1977, at 26, col. 2.
38 67 N.J. at 193-221, 336 A.2d at 735-50. (Pashman, J., concurring).
39 Id. at 194, 336 A.2d at 736. For critical comment on Justice Pashman's opinion,
see Note, 74 MICH. L. REV., supra note 13, at 772-73.
40 67 N.J. at 193, 336 A.2d at 735.
Justice Pashman noted that exclusionary zoning involves two improper practices: (1)
"tak[ing] advantage of the benefits of regional development without having to bear [its]
burdens"; and (2) creating "enclaves of affluence or of social homogeneity." Id. at 195,
336 A.2d at 736. Both practices were characterized as being facially violative of both the
New Jersey constitution and the zoning enabling act, as well as being "repugnant to the
ideals of the pluralistic democracy which America has become." Id.
41Id. at 197-203, 336 A.2d at 737-40; see Williams & Norman, supra note 7, at 477.
42 67 N.J. at 197, 336 A.2d at 737.
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herently exclusionary in effect." 4 3 These included minimum house
size, lot size or frontage requirements 44 and the prohibition of multi45
family housing.
Due to the ingrained nature of these devices in New Jersey's
suburbs, it was asserted that, at the very least, strong judicial action
was needed. 4 6 He argued for the imposition of an affirmative obligation upon developing municipalities to actively cooperate with other
municipalities within the appropriate region, 4 7 as well as with state
and federal agencies which provide assistance in the planning and
funding of housing. 48 so that the actual provision of low and moderate
49
income housing would be made more realistically possible.
43Id.

44Id. at 197-99, 336 A.2d at 737-38. The significance of such requirements in placing upward pressure on new construction should not be overlooked. For example, the
opinion contends that "floor space is the single most important factor contributing to
differences in prices for new housing, even more important than the socio-economic
status of the municipality." Id. at 199, 336 A.2d at 738 (relying upon G. SAGALYN &
L. STERNLIEB, ZONING AND HOUSING COSTs 48 (1972)).
Although it is more difficult to calculate the effect of minimum lot size and frontage
requirements on the cost of housing, there is little doubt that they, too, significantly
increase prices. 67 N.J. at 200, 336 A.2d at 738-39 (relying upon Williams & Norman,
supra note 7, at 493-97).
4567 N.J. at 200-01, 336 A.2d at 739 (Pashman, J., concurring). Since multi-family
housing is usually the type most affordable by those in lower economic categories the
adverse effect on such groups by prohibition of such housing is obvious. Id. at 200, 336
A.2d at 739.
46 Id. at 203, 336 A.2d at 740. Rather than rely upon action by local or state authorities, Justice Pashman would have had the court take notice, inter alia, of the ever
increasing pressures for more and decent housing. Id. at 203-05, 336 A.2d at 740-41. He
also stressed the danger that a lack of affirmative corrective measures would allow the
perpetuation of exclusionary practices to have the effect of "freezing in" permanent
exclusionary characteristics. 67 N.J. at 207, 336 A.2d at 742.
47Id. at 210, 336 A.2d at 744. This obligation is premised on the theory that once a
municipality undertakes to exercise the zoning power, as permitted by statute, it must
do so in a fashion consistent with the broadly based general welfare concept. Id. at 195,
209-10, 336 A.2d at 736, 743-44.
48 Id. at 211, 336 A.2d at 744-45.
49 Id., 336 A.2d at 744. It is suggested that "[flailure to actively cooperate in the
implementation of [state and federal] programs as effectively thwarts the meeting of
regional needs for low and moderate income housing as does outright exclusion." Id. It
might even be necessary, he continued, to impose an affirmative duty upon a municipality to actually provide low and moderate income housing, whether by public construction, ownership or management. Id., 336 A.2d at 745. Justice Pashman cites, for example, the Local Housing Authorities Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. 55:14A-1 to -58 (West 1964 &
Cum. Supp. 1977-1978). This statute provides, in part: "The governing body of two or
more municipalities may by joint action or ordinances create a public body corporate and
politic to be known as '[the] Regional Housing Authority.' " Id. § 14A-4.
In order to administer effectively the type of relief suggested, Justice Pashman
would have required a four-step procedure at the trial court level: that court should
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The approach of the New Jersey supreme court in Mount Laurel,
revolutionary in comparison to previous judicial approaches, 50 initiated much speculation as to the way in which certain questions
would be dealt with in subsequent cases. 5 1 For example, the court
did not define the crucial terms "fair share" and "region." In addition, the court did not, as Justice Pashman would have wished, set
out a detailed program for attaining specific housing goals. Several
post-Mount Laurel commentators suggested that the majority's approach was proper in that regard, contending that the solution to the
problem lies beyond the province of the judiciary. 5 2 However, the
court did leave open the possibility that further judicial action would
be forthcoming if necessary. 5 3 The commentators who felt that the

court's broad guidelines left municipalities far too much room for evasion of the Mount Laurel mandate maintained that judicial interven54
tion was an absolute necessity.

Whether or not the members of the court had the Madison
Township case in mind when they framed their renedy in Mount
Laurel can only be conjectured. 55 However, the court was again required to immerse itself into "the dark side of municipal land use
regulation" 5 6 when Madison Township's amended zoning ordinance
was declared wholly invalid as failing to provide for that municipality's
57
fair share of the regional need for low and moderate income housing.
determine the appropriate region; identify the need for housing, both present and futture, in that region; proceed to determine and allocate a fair share of this regional need
to each municipality in the region; and formulate a fitting remedial order. 67 N.J. at
215-16, 336 A.2d at 746-47. To avoid conflicting decisions in any given region, it was
suggested that very early on in any litigation, all municipalities in the appropriate region
be joined in the action. Id. at 216, 336 A.2d at 747; see N.J.R. 4:28-1; N.J.R. 4:30.
In referring to municipalities which had already been developed in an exclusionary
manner, Justice Pashman indicated that those municipalities should have an affirmative
duty to provide low and moderate income housing to the extent that such a requirement
would not "grossly distur[b] existing neighborhoods." 67 N.J. at 217-18, 336 A.2d
at 748.
50 See notes 2-7 supra and accompanying text.
5iSee, e.g., Mallach, supra note 13.
52 See, e.g., Comment, supra note 16, at 213-18; Note, 74 %ICH. L. REV., supra note
13 at 793-94. See generally Burchell, Listokin & James, Exclusionary Zonitig: Pitfalls of
the Regional Remedy, 7 URB. LAW. 262 (1975).
5367 N.J. at 192, 336 A.2d at 734.
54See, e.g., Mallach, supra note 13, at 663-66; Mytelka & Mytelka, supra note 13,
at 18-20.
55At the time of the Mount Laurel decision, the Madison Township case was scheduled for reargumlent before the supreme court after there had been a second adjudication
that the township's zoning ordinance was invalid. 72 N.J. at 491-92, 371 A.2d at 1196.
56 67 N.J. at 193, 336 A.2d at 735 (Pashman, J.,
concurring).
-7Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 128 N.J. Super. 438, 320 A.2d
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THE MADISON TOWNSHIP CASE

Trial Court Decisions

In 1971, Judge Furman, in the first of two trial court opinions,
invalidated Madison's zoning ordinance on the ground that only a
minimun amount of vacant and developable land was zoned for inexpensive homes on small lots or multi-family dwellings. 58 By so
zoning, the municipality had failed to provide for "a balanced community" and fell short of meeting even local housing needs. 59 Judge
Furman repeatedly referred to the regional housing needs and the
fact that the "general welfare" mentioned in the zoning enabling legislation "does not stop at each municipal boundary."60 The concept of
region was to become increasingly significant as the litigation pro61

ceeded.
Madison Township appealed the trial court decision and the supreme court granted certification. 6 2 The court had entertained oral
argument in March 1973, but before additional arguments could be
heard, the township adopted extensive amendments to its zoning
ordinance. 6 3 Therefore, the supreme court remanded for a determi64
nation of the validity of the amended ordinance.
In evaluating the 1973 ordinance, Judge Furman found that it
fell "palpably short" of providing for low and moderate income housing capacity at least approximately equivalent to Madison's fair share
223 (Law Div. 1974). For an outline of the various stages of the Madison Township case
prior to final adjudication by the supreme court, see D. MOSKOWlTZ, supra note 1,
at 246.
58 Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d
353 (Law Div. 1971), cert. granted, 62 N.J. 185, 299 A.2d 720 (1972), on remand, 128
N.J. Super. 438, 320 A.2d 223 (1974). The plaintiffs in the case were comprised of
two developers, who own[ed] vacant and developable land in Madison Township, and six individuals, all with low income, representing as a class those who
reside outside the township and have sought housing there unsuccessfully because of the newly adopted zoning restrictions.
117 N.J. Super. at 14, 283 A.2d at 354.
" 117 N.J. Super. at 21, 283 A.2d at 358. The trial court found that new housing and
the one and two acre zones would be affordable only by those with incomes in the top
10% of the county. Id. at 16-17, 283 A.2d at 356. Yet 55% of the township's land was so
zoned. Id. at 16, 283 A.2d at 356.
60 Id. at 20, 283 A.2d at 358.
61 See, e.g., Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 128 N.J. Super. 438,
441, 320 A.2d 223, 224 (Law Div. 1974); 72 N.J. at 498-500, 371 A.2d at 1200-01.
62 Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 62 N.J. 185, 299 A.2d 720
(1972).
63 Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 128 N.J. Super. 438, 439, 320
A.2d 223, 223 (Law Div. 1974).
64 Id. at 439-40, 320 A.2d at 223.
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of the regional need. 65 The new ordinance provided only "token" expansion of the areas zoned for moderate income housing and no opportunities for low income housing. 66 Of the vacant and developable
residential acreage, eighty percent remained zoned for homes on one
or two acre lots. 67 Thus, realistically, only "about 3,500" units, or less
than ten percent of any new construction, could have been expected
to be available for those whose earnings were within even the moderate income range. 6 8 In contrast, low and moderate income persons
already accounted for twelve percent and nineteen percent, respectively, of the township's population when the ordinance was enacted. 6 9
On this basis, the amended ordinance was struck down in its entirety. 70
The Supreme Court Decision
The trial court decision was again appealed, and the supreme
court heard oral arguments, with particular emphasis placed upon the
effect of the Mount Laurel decision on the issues presented. 7 1 In reviewing the significant factors affecting the case, the court stated that
the two opinions by Judge Furman 72 reflected "the basic rationale"
65 Id. at 447, 320 A.2d at 227. Judge Furman noted that "the township planner conceded that there [was] virtually no potential for low-income housing and no incentives
in the ordinance or amendments to build low or moderate-income housing." Id. at 445,
320 A.2d at 226-27. Thus, the amended ordinance could not promise additional low and
moderate income housing units in proportion to its percentage of low and moderate
income population-12% and 19% respectively. Id. at 447, 320 A.2d at 227.
66 Id. at 446, 320 A.2d at 227. The opinion states that "[t]he zoning objective in
1970 of an elite community of high income families with few children is maintained by
the 1973 amendments. The advances towards moderate-income housing opportunities
are token, towards low-income housing opportunities nil." Id.
67 Id.
66 Id. Virtually no new units could be expected for those in low income categories,
i.e., $9,000 a year or less. Id.
69 Id.

70 Id. at 447, 320 A.2d at 227. The holding specified that Madison could not meet its
obligation unless the zoning ordinance provided for low and moderate income housing
approximately in proportion to its low and moderate income population. Id.; see note 65
supra.
71 72 N.J. at 491-92, 371 A.2d at 1196. The court heard oral arguments twice and
"considered supplemental briefs and materials." Id. at 492, 371 A.2d at 1196. Among
the supplemental briefs submitted were responses to a list of eighteen questions which
the court directed to the parties. See Payne, Delegation Doctrine in the Reform of Local
Government Law: The Case of Exclusionary Zoning, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 803, 816-17
& n.47 (1976); D. MOSKOWITZ, supra note 1, at 272-75 & n.1. The questions, as presented to the attorneys, involved, inter alia, the appropriateness of various judicial responses including whether or not the court should determine a specific region and fairshare in zoning cases. D. MOSKOWITZ, supra at 271-302; Payne, supra at 816 n.47.
72 Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d
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underlying the Mount Laurel doctrine. 73 The court summarized the
thrust of that doctrine as the requirement that absent "legislation
providing for regional zoning authorities ," ' 74 developing municipalities
which avail themselves of the zoning power must "serve and not impede the general welfare represented by satisfaction of the housing
needs of lower income people throughout the region." 75 The Municipal Land Use Law, 76 enacted subsequent to both the second trial
court decision in Madison Township and the supreme court decision
in Mount Laurel, was interpreted as not diminishing "the continued
77
viability of Mount Laurel."
353 (Law Div. 1971); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 128 N.J. Super.
438, 320 A.2d 223 (Law Div. 1974).
73 72 N.J. at 494, 371 A.2d at 1198. The only qualification to the statement was that
the supreme court ruling in Mount Laurel rested on state constitutional grounds. Id.;
see 67 N.J. at 175, 336 A.2d at 725; notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text.
74 72 N.J. at 495, 371 A.2d at 1198.
75 Id. (citing the Mount Laurel decision, 67 N.J. at 188-90, 336 A.2d at 732-33).
It has been suggested by Professor Payne that due to the complexities of exclusionary zoning problems, as well as the inherent deficiencies of judicial solutions, the
zoning enabling legislation should be delared unconstitutional on the basis that it constitutes an improper delegation of power to local governing bodies. Payne, supra note
71, at 819-21. Apparently, this argument was not persuasive. See 72 N.J. at 547-48, 371
A.2d at 1225-26.
76 Municipal Land Use Law, 1975 N.J. Laws, ch. 291 (codified at N.J. STAT ANN.
§§ 40:55D-1 to -10, -66 to -92 (West Cum. Supp. 1976-1977)).
77 72 N.J. at 496-97, 371 A.2d at 1199. The court looked closely at the enumerated
purposes of the act and declared that there was no conflict with its holding in Mount
Laurel. The pertinent sections of the law enumerating its purposes read as follows:
It is the intent and purpose of this act:
a. To encourage municipal action to guide the appropriate use or development
of all lands in this State, in a manner which will promote the public health,
safety, morals, and general welfare;
c. To provide adequate light, air and open space;
d. To ensure that the development of individual municipalities does not conflict with the development and general welfare of neighboring municipalities,
the county and the State as a whole;
e. To promote the establishment of appropriate population densities and concentrations that will contribute to the well-being of persons, neighborhoods,
communities and regions and preservation of the environment;
j. To promote the conservation of open space and valuable natural resources
and to prevent urban sprawl and degradation of the environment through improper use of land;
k. To encourage planned unit developments which incorporate the best features of design and relate the type, design and layout of residential, commercial, industrial and recreational development to the particular site; and
m. To encourage coordination of the various public and private procedures and
activities shaping land development with a view of lessening the cost of such

1977]

COMMENTS

The court made a fundamental determination that Madison
Township was "an archetypal 'developing' municipality" as contemplated by Mount Laurel.78 The town enjoyed an extensive transportation network, 7 9 easy access to both metropolitan centers and recreational areas8" and "ha[d] experienced explosive growth" over the past
two and one-half decades. 81 In addition, Madison Township's poten82
tial for further development was by no means exhausted.
Accompanying its fantastic rate of development, Madison Town83
ship had experienced mounting upward pressure on its tax rates.
The zoning ordinance enacted in 1970 had been an attempt to stem
the surge of municipal expenses by retarding the growth rate. 8 4 The
revisions made in 1973 appeared to increase the housing potential,8 5
but certain requirements of the ordinance would have significantly
increased construction costs. The mandated minimum lot size, 8 6 mindevelopment and to the more efficient use of land.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-2 (West Cum. Supp. 1976-1977) (emphasis added).
78 72 N.J. at 501, 371 A.2d at 1201 (citing Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. at 173, 187, 336
A.2d at 724, 731-32).
7972 N.J. at 500-01, 371 A.2d at 1201. The township is traversed by the Garden
State Parkway, State Highways 18, 34 and 35, U.S. Route 9, and county roads 527, 516
and 520. Together these highways provide easy access to the urban centers of Newark
and 8Elizabeth,
to New York City, and to the New Jersey shore area. Id.
0
ld.
81
Id.at 501, 371 A.2d at 1201. The population of the township increased from 7,366
in 1950 to 48,715 by 1970-a jump of 561%. Id. By 1974, the population had reached
55,000. Id.
82 Id. at 501-02, 371 A.2d at 1201-02. The court looked to the fact that
[almong the twenty-five municipalities in Middlesex County, Madison in 1970
ranked 20th lowest both in population density and housing density. Vacant
acreage is plentiful; of the township's 25,000 acres, between 8,143 and 11,000
are vacant and developable. The township is a sprawling municipality marked
by little continuity and spotty development.
Id.
83 Id. at 501, 371 A.2d at 1201; see Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 14, 283 A.2d 353, 355 (Law Div. 1971), where Judge Furman
pointed out that Madison's property tax rate went from one of the lowest in Middlesex
County in 1950 to the county's highest in 1970.
84 See 72 N.J. at 503, 371 A.2d at 1202; Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of
Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 14, 283 A.2d 353, 355 (Law Div. 1971). The first trial court
opinion acknowledged that there was no dispute as to this point, noting that "[a] new
township administration in 1970 determined to curb population growth significantly and
thus to stablize [sic] the tax rate. The township was to 'catch its breath,' a phrase recurrent in the testimony." 117 N.J. Super. at 14, 283 A.2d at 355.
85 72 N.J. at 504, 371 A.2d at 1203. The total land available for housing was increased by 800 acres and the total potential housing capacity by 16,000 units. Id.
86 Id. at 504-05, 371 A.2d at 1203-04. Five areas zoned for single-family units comprised 72% of the vacant residential land. Two zones calling for minimum lots of one
(R-40) and two acres (R-80) "account[ed] for 42% of the total acreage within the township, 58% of its vacant developable acreage, 70% of the total acreage zoned single-
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imum floor area ratio in the multi-family zone, 8 7 and the maximum
density restrictions in the planned unit development zone 8 8-known
as cost generating provisions-combined to militate against the construction of high density housing affordable by low and moderate income families. 8 9 Exclusion of these groups, it was hoped, would reduce the need for increased municipal services. 90
In evaluating the ordinance, the court accepted, arguendo, the
family, and 80% of vacant developable single family acreage." Id. at 504, 371 A.2d at
1203. Referring to the remaining small percentage of land zoned for high density development, the court noted that in applying Justice Hall's criteria in Mount Laurel that
lot sizes of from 9,375 to 20,000 square feet are in reality large lot zoning, see 67 N.J. at
183, 336 A.2d at 729-30, then nearly 70% of Madison Township was zoned for low
density and thus, high cost, development. 72 N.J. at 505, 509-10, 371 A.2d at 1204,
1206.
8772 N.J. at 506-07, 371 A.2d at 1204. The bedroom restrictions of the 1970 ordinance, Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 17, 283
A.2d 353, 356 (Law Div. 1971), 80% one bedroom, 20% two bedroom, were replaced by
limits on the amount of construction per acre in the multi-family zone. The limit, known
as a floor area ratio, was set at 10,000 square feet per acre. The effect of this restriction,
when the economics of the construction industry are taken into account, would be to
encourage development of "only small units (efficiencies and one bedrooms)." 72 N.J.
at 506, 371 A.2d at 1204.
88 72 N.J. at 507-08, 371 A.2d at 1204-05. Although Madison argued that the
planned unit development (PUD) zones would allow it to satisfy its low and moderate
income housing obligation, the court found this to be "illusory" after close analysis. Id.
The court stated:
Three areas are zoned for PUD-two of which are on remote sites unserviced
by water and sewer utilities. PUD requirements vary, depending upon the
amount of land in the developer's tract. A Class I PUD, between 150 and 300
acres, has a maximum density of 3.5 units per acre. Of all the units constructed
in a Class I PUD, a minimum of 30% must be detached single-family units, and
the remainder may be medium density multi-family. A Class II PUD, between
300 and 500 acres, has a maximum density of 4.25 units per acre; a minimum of
17.5% of the units must be single-family, a maximum of 12.5% may be high
density, and the remainder medium density. Class III PUDs (over 500 acres)
are the most favored, with an allowable density of 5.0, 12.5% minimum singlefamily detached and maximum 17.5% high density. The densities allowed in
the PUD zones are 20% lower than those originally proposed by the municipal
planners. Moreover, it is unlikely that the highest density (5.0) will ever be
utilized as there are within the PUD zones no 500-acre parcels owned by a
single entity, and accumulation of the necessary number of acres is, according
to the credible evidence, neither "possible nor probable."
Id., 371 A.2d at 1205 (footnotes omitted).
These density restrictions were found to be more severe than those permitted by
Mount Laurel, which allowed as many as six and seven units per acre. Id. at 508 n.18,
371 A.2d at 1205.
89 Id. at 508-10, 371 A.2d at 1205-06. The arrangement and restrictions in the various zones favored "low density, middle and high income residential uses." Id. at
509-10, 371 A.2d at 1206.
90 See Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 128 N.J. Super. 438, 446,
320 A.2d 223, 227 (Law Div. 1974).
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town planners' use of Middlesex County as Madison's appropriate region. After the 1973 amendments, only twelve percent to seventeen
percent of any new housing units would have been affordable by
those earning moderate incomes. 9 1 In addition, realistically, no new
housing would have become available for those in the low income
category. 92 This effect was the result of the cost generating factors
(minimum and maximum requirements) of the ordinance. 9 3 Thus,
when these figures on housing potential were compared with the
findings of the trial court as to the number of people in Madison
Township earning low and moderate incomes, 94 the court concluded
"that the 1973 zoning ordinance d[id] not hold the promise of an opportunity to meet that [existing] need and at the same time satisfy
95
the prospective continuing need in the foreseeable" future.

Among the clear failures of the ordinance were the lack of a provision for single-family homes on small lots; 9 6 the disproportionate
amount of land zoned for expensive housing compared to that zoned
for multi-family, lower cost housing;9 7 and the fact that there existed
"little or no ...

market" for the one and two acre single-family

homes9 8 for which fifty-eight percent of the total vacant developable
land was zoned.9 9 Not even the multi-family and planned unit development (PUD) zoning provisions were sufficiently effective to save

the ordinance from invalidation. 10 0 For instance, even though the
bedroom restrictions of the 1970 ordinance had been removed,' 01 the
effect of the maximum bulk and density regulations in the multi-

family zone would have had the effect, economically, of dictating construction of eighty percent one bedroom and twenty percent two
bedroom units. 102
It was suggested that the town could have counteracted this effect by using its zoning power to affirmatively encourage the con91 72 N.J. at 515, 371 A.2d at 1209. The $10,000 per year figure had been used by
the trial court as the upper limit of moderate income. Id. at 515 n.25, 371 A.2d at 1209.
92Id. at 515, 371 A.2d at 1209.
" See id. at 515-16, 371 A.2d at 1209; notes 86-89 supra and accompanying text.
94 See Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 128 N.J. Super. 438, 446,
320 A.2d 223, 227 (Law Div. 1974).
95 72 N.J. at 515, 371 A.2d at 1208-09 (emphasis added).
96 Id. at 515-16, 371 A.2d at 1209; see 67 N.J. at 187, 336 A.2d at 732.
97 72 N.J. at 515-16, 371 A.2d at 1208-09; see note 86 supra.
98 72 N.J. at 516, 371 A.2d at 1209.
99 Id. at 504, 371 A.2d at 1203; see note 86 supra.
100 See 72 N.J. at 516-17, 519-24, 371 A.2d at 1209-10, 1211-13; see notes 87-88
supra.
101 72 N.J. at 516, 371 A.2d at 1209; see note 87 supra.
102 72 N.J. at 516, 371 A.2d at 1209; see note 87 supra.
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struction of multi-bedroom units by providing density bonuses, 10 3
minimum bedroom requirements, 10 4 and expansion of the floor-area
ratio in the multi-family zone.10 5 The court went so far as to endorse
the concept of density bonuses, even though it was not at issue and
had not been argued in the case. 10 6 The question whether "rent
skewing"-attempting to encourage construction of lower income
units by permitting the distribution of certain construction costs to7
10
relatively higher priced units-would be an acceptable approach
was specifically reserved as one requiring "legislative study and attention.'1 08
In reviewing the PUD provisions of the ordinance, the court examined the requirement that each developer supply the roadways,
water and sewerage facilities for these developments. 10 9 The effect of
these "municipal exactions" was measured against what the court
labeled as the "corollary of Mount Laurel."110 That is, when the exactions "reach such proportions as to exert an exclusionary influence"
by making the cost of constructing low cost housing economically un103 72 N.J. at 517, 371 A.2d at 1209. The court described density bonus as "the
bonus of. . . an additional single-bedroom or efficiency (in addition to those densities
generally permitted) for every three- or four-bedroom unit constructed." id. n.27, 371
A.2d at 1209.
Significantly, as the court pointed out, all of the experts at the trial had agreed "that
such a device is a vital weapon in the armament of affirmative zoning for adequate
housing of families in all income categories." Id. at 517, 371 A.2d at 1210.
104 Id., 371 A.2d at 1209.
105 Id. For a discussion of various affirmative steps taken by some municipalities in
other states, see Kleven, supra note 32, at 1436, wherein the author suggests that due to
the plethora of exclusionary zoning suits being initiated, some municipalities have considered enacting inclusionary zoning ordinances as an alternative to being sued. See
also Note, 56 MINN. L. REV., supra note 32.
l06 72 N.J. at 517, 371 A.2d at 1210; see note 103 supra.
8
107 72 N.J. at 518 & n.2 , 371 A.2d at 1210. Rent skewing, in general, refers
to the imposition of a greater proportion of land, construction or other costs on
one group of units in a development in order to lower the eventual rental or
sale price of another group of units therein. Rent skewing can be encouraged

by a municipality in two ways: requiring that a mandatory percentage of moderately priced dwellings be constructed (this is often referred to as an MPMPD
ordinance) or allowing a developer a density bonus....
Id. n.28, 371 A.2d at 1210. See also Kleven, supra note 32, at 1442-48.
108 72 N.J. at 519, 371 A.2d at 1210.
10 9 Id. at 521, 371 A.2d at 1211-12. These requirements, known as "subdivision requirements" or "municipal exactions," id. at 520, 371 A.2d at 1211, are a means of having
the developer bear the initial burden of improving the area surrounding a development.
See id. at 520-22, 371 A.2d at 1211-12. This expense is in turn passed along by the developer as part of the cost of the units in the development. See generally Heyman &
Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964).
110 72 N.J. at 520, 371 A.2d at 1211.
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feasible, they violate the Mount Laurel mandate. 1 ' In the case of the
particular exactions placed upon PUD developers by Madison Township, the court found that certain sites chosen for PUD zoning were
in remote areas and were selected deliberately "to force the .
developers and their customers to carry the burden of developing"
these areas."12 Thus, this and other cost-generating factors 1 3 built
into the PUD provisions would have effectively precluded development of the PUD zones within the next decade. 11 4 The court was
convinced by its analysis of these provisions that the ordinance failed
to provide an opportunity for the construction of Madison's fair share
of lower income housing, even based on the use of Middlesex County
as the appropriate region." 5
Least Cost Approach
"A key consideration" in Madison Township, and in the area of
exclusionary zoning generally, 116 was the fact that in the present
economic climate, private developers cannot profitably build housing
for those in low and middle income categories. 11 7 This consideration
had been noted in Mount Laurel, 118 but attained new significance in
111 Id.
112 Id. at 522, 371 A.2d at 1212. This factor alone was sufficient for the court to state
"that a prima facie case of exclusion ha[d] been made out with respect to the road and
facility requirements," id., thus shifting the burden to the municipality to advance arguments justifying the exactions. Id. at 522-23, 371 A.2d at 1212. Under these circumstances, Madison had not met this burden and therefore would be required on remand to
"(1) eliminate these requirements or revise them to render them not exclusionary; (2)
require proportionate donation by other property holders; or (3) relocate these or other
PUD tracts nearer to utility hookups." Id. at 523, 371 A.2d at 1212.
113Particularly objectionable was the long drawn-out approval process. Id. at
523-24, 371 A.2d at 1212-13. The process involved three stages including an " 'informal
preliminary application' " step, id. at 523, 371 A.2d at 1213, and concededly one full
year could be consumed in completing the approval process. Id. Plaintiffs contended
that the procedure would actually require one-and-one-half to two full years. Id. Such a
lengthy approval process would, of course, add to the cost of the eventual units in any
development. Id.
114 Id. at 522, 371 A.2d at 1212.
115 Id. at 514-15, 371 A.2d at 1208-09.
116Id. at 510, 371 A.2d at 1206.
117 Id.; cf. D. MOSKOWITZ, supra note 1, at 286 (stating that developers are not

likely to be sympathetic to the interests of excluded classes). See also Mallach, supra
note 12, at 660-63 (stating that one of the obstacles to low and moderate income housing construction is the fact that high building costs render non-subsidized housing of
that type unfeasible, even absent exclusionary zoning).
118 67 N.J. at 170 n.8, 336 A.2d at 722. There the court admitted that construction of
low and moderate income housing requires "incentive[s] by some level of government,"
id., yet it was not deterred from requiring municipalities to provide land for such con-
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the Madison Township case by subtly altering "the mandate of Mount
Laurel."119
In Madison Township, the defendant had argued that economic
realities 2 0 make it impractical to attempt to enforce any obligation to
provide low and moderate income housing. 12 1 The court, in answer
to this position, conceded that it may not be realistic to presume that
the mere provision of appropriately zoned vacant land would result in
actual development.1 22 The fact that new low cost housing could not
be provided would not, however, excuse municipalities from attempting to comply with Mount Laurel. The court announced, as an alternative method of compliance, that as a bare minimum, municipalities
must "adjust [their] zoning regulations so as to render possible and
feasible the 'least cost' housing . . . which private industry will undertake" to construct.' 2 3 This "least cost" alternative is only appropriate, however, in situations where private builders, even with
assistance,' 2 4 cannot meet the township's fair share of the regional
need for low and moderate income housing, and then only insofar as
125
necessary "to satisfy the deficit in the hypothesized fair share."'
This qualification was based upon the court's recognition of the effects
of a process known as "filtering down."' 2 6 The process begins when
middle to upper-middle income housing is built. Some families, occupying low and moderate income homes, will move into this new
housing and leave behind an availability of lower income housing.

struction in proportion to the township's fair share of the regional need. Id. at 174, 336
A.2d at 724.
119 72 N.J. at 513, 371 A.2d at 1208. The Madisou Township court spoke not in
terms of zoning for low and moderate income housing, as did the Mount Laurel court in
67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724, but in terms of zoning for least cost housing. 72 N.J. at
513, 371 A.2d at 1208.
120 The defendant specifically contended that in the present economy, private developers would not undertake to construct lower income housing. 72 N.J. at 512, 371 A.2d
at 1207.
121 Id.
122

Id. The court speaks in terms of seeking "the only acceptable alternative re-

course if in fact private enterprise cannot economically construct the housing needed for
lower income families." Id.
123

Id.

124

Id. The assistance could be in the form of legislatively authorized incentives, see

id., such as "tax concessions and mandatory sponsorship of or membership in public
housing projects" by the town. Id. at 546, 371 A.2d at 1224. Such assistance, however,
requires at least legislative authorization. Id.
125 Id. at 512, 371 A.2d at 1207.
126 Id. at 513-14 & n.22, 371 A.2d at 1208. The filtering down concept only "indirectly provide[s] additional and better housing for" lower income families. Id. at 514,
371 A.2d at 1208 (emphasis added).
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Thus, while not all low and moderate income families would have
newly built housing available to them, the total supply of housing for
that group would be enlarged.1 27 By this approach, the court apparently conceded that a limited retreat from the "low and moderate
income housing" requirement of Mount Laurel was a practical necessity. However, even judged against this "least cost" standard, the
12 8
1973 ordinance was clearly inadequate.
Fair Share and Region
Faced with the inadequacies of the amended ordinance, the
court focused upon the most controversial aspect of applying the
129
Mount Laurel doctrine-that of the appropriate judicial remedy.
Significantly, there was diversity among the justices as to the appropriate relief to be ordered.' 3 0 Much of the controversy involved the
3
proper approach to the concepts of "fair share" and "region."''
Judge Conford, writing for the majority, carefully framed the issue as
being whether the court should determine the specific relevant region of which the municipality is a part, and if so, whether it should
allocate a definitive proportion of low and moderate income housing
units to the municipality as its fair share.13 2 The simple answer to both
parts of the issue was in the negative. 133 Yet, the length and substance
of the court's discussion of these two concepts are indicative of their
13 4
importance and of the degree of difficulty in dealing with them.
In order to make clear just what it was attempting to do, the
court set out some "[p]reliminary [c]onsiderations" to guide those
127 Id. at 513-14, 371 A.2d at 1208. Judicial discussion of this process prompted
some observers to characterize the Madison Township decision as a "strategic 'retreat'"
from Mount Laurel. Newark Star-Ledger, Mar. 27, 1977, at 26, col. 1.
128 72 N.J. at 514, 371 A.2d at 1208. The fact that the overall impact of the zoning
ordinance was to encourage primarily "middle and high income residential uses," id. at
509-10, 371 A.2d at 1206, obviously negates the possibility of "least cost" housing. See
id.at 514-24, 371 A.2d at 1208-13; notes 86-102 Sunpra and accompanying text.
129 See, e.g., D. MOSKOWITZ, supra note 1, at 271-302; Mytelka & Mytelka, supra
note 13, at 18-32; Note, 74 MICH. L. REV., supra note 13, at 766-86.
130 See 72 N.J. at 548-54, 371 A.2d at 1226-28 (majority opinion); id. at 556-76, 371
A.2d at 1229-40 (Pashman, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 621-23, 371 A.2d at
1262-63 (Schreiber, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 625-31, 371 A.2d at 1264-67
(Mountain, J., concurring and dissenting).
131 See note 130 supra.
132 72

N.J. at 497, 371 A.2d at 1199.

133id.
134

The opinion of the court devotes a total of 24 pages out of a total of 64 to a

discussion of the various aspects of the "fair share and region" issue. See id.at 498-500,
524-44, 371 A.2d at 1200-01, 1213-23.
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13 5
who would be required to deal with these concepts in future cases.
These initial remarks were followed by a more detailed discussion of
fair share and region. 136 The court began with the proposition that it
is not necessary for municipalities to determine specific numbers for
their fair share of housing in a precise geographic region, 137 nor
138
would the trial court be required to make such specific findings.
This position would appear to hinder any attempt to enforce the
Mount Laurel principle that the township must "provide the opportunity to meet a fair share of the regional burden for low and moderate income housing needs."' 139 This seeming paradox is the result of
several practical considerations which persuaded the court to confine
its "mandate" to generalities. 140
First the court found, based upon all of the evidence submitted,
that "numerical housing goals are not realistically translatable into
specific substantive changes in a zoning ordinance."' 14 1 Further, the
court would not impose a duty on municipalities either to build or to
subsidize housing. 14 2 A second consideration was that the diverse
economic and sociological factors involved in determining region and
fair share, coupled with the wide variety of approaches taken by experts, precluded the establishment of any specific formulae for de43
termining either factor by judicial fiat.1
These two practicalities led the court to formulate an approach to
fair share and region which appears to be another subtle alteration of
the position originally stated in Mount Laurel. The Madison
Township opinion directs courts and local governing bodies to look

135 Id. at 498-99, 371 A.2d at 1200 (emphasis deleted).
136 Id. at 531-44, 371 A.2d at 1216-23.
137 Id. at 498-99, 371 A.2d at 1200.
138 Id. at 499, 371 A.2d at 1200. The court was influenced in this regard by the fact
that "[t]here are too many imponderables between a zone change and the actual production of housing on sites as zoned, not to mention the production of a specific
number of lower cost units in a given period of time." Id.
139 Id. at 498, 371 A.2d at 1200 (emphasis added); see 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at
724. The immediate and obvious question is how may a township draft a zoning ordinance which will allow it to meet the Mount Laurel mandate when there is no approved method for determining its region and its fair share. See 72 N.J. at 588-95, 371
A.2d at 1246-49 (Pashman, J., concurring and dissenting) (urging that firm guidelines for
calculation of region and fair share are imperative if an effective remedy is to be
granted).
140 Id. at 499, 531-44, 371 A.2d at 1200, 1216-23. For a good discussion of the concepts of fair share and region as they relate to the issue of judicial remedies, see D.
MOSKOWITZ, supra note 1, at 303-20.
141 72 N.J. at 499, 371 A.2d at 1200.
142
1

Id.

4 Id.
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"to the substance of a zoning ordinance under challenge and to bona
fide efforts toward the elimination or minimization of undue costgenerating requirements.' 14 4 This, it is suggested, will be more productive than judicial imposition of various fair share formulae or allo45
cation plans. 1
The above position, while not an absolute retreat from the
Mount Laurel doctrine, clearly alters one of the guidelines established in that case. The instruction that courts are to look to the bona
fide efforts of the municipality strongly implies that something more
than exclusionary effect-the focal point of Mount Laurel-is to be
considered when evaluating contested zoning ordinances. 14 6 Whether
this is indeed a new policy can only be determined by future litigation. However, by this language the court has added another issue to
be resolved in determining whether a zoning scheme violates the
Mount Laurel standard.
Having recognized the deficiencies inherent in judicial attempts
to solve the problem, the court nevertheless attempted to give some
guidance to municipalities by discussing several approaches to the is14 7
sues of fair share and region which might be minimally acceptable.
However, the court did digress briefly in order to offer its conception
of the most practical solution: establishment of an administrative
agency operating pursuant to legislative authorization. 14 8 Such an
agency, if staffed with the necessary expertise, would be able to allocate housing needs "with relative fairness"'149 among the various
0
municipalities within a clearly demarcated region.15
Turning then to the crucially important concept of region, the

144 Id. (emphasis in original).
145 Id. Again, the court is apparently concerned with ultimate housing availability.

See notes 122-128 supra and accompanying text.
14 Compare 72 N.J. at 499, 371 A.2d at 1200 with 67 N.J. at 159, 174, 336 A.2d at
717, 724.
147 72 N.J. at 535-36, 371 A.2d at 1219.
148 Id. at 531-33 & n.37, 371 A.2d at 1216-17; see notes 141-43 supra and accompanying text.
149 72 N.J. at 531, 371 A.2d at 1217.
0
15 Id. at 531-34, 371 A.2d at 1216-18. The language used to make this point is
quite strong:
We take this occasion to make explicit what we adumbrated in Mount Laurel
and have intimated above-that the governmental-sociological-economic enterprise of seeing to the provision and allocation throughout appropriate regions of
adequate and suitable housing for all categories of the population is much more
appropriately a legislative and administrative function rather than a judicial
function to be exercised in the disposition of isolated cases.
Id. at 534, 371 A.2d at 1218 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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majority set forth, as a basic premise, that the relevant region should
be one which corresponds to that area from which the population can
be expected to come, in view of existing job opportunities and transportation.' 5 ' The designation of a single county as such a region was
52
labeled unrealistic and disapproved.1
Although the stated guideline for "region" is, of necessity, very
general, 153 the court did indicate, by way of illustration, the type of
region which might be acceptable. 154 An ordinance drafted pursuant
to "an official fair share housing study of a group of counties"' 155 authorized by either the legislative or executive branch may, according
to the court, warrant "prima facie judicial acceptance" insofar as the

region utilized. 156 The key to this illustration is the reliance upon
"fair share allocation plans executed under official or quasi-official
auspices"' 157 as opposed to those decreed by judicial fiat or artificially
constructed by a defendant municipality.1 58 Anticipating that
municipalities might rely upon regions determined by experts, the
court advised that such experts must give proper attention to "areas
from which the lower income population of the municipality would
substantially be drawn absent exclusionary zoning."' 159 Such a region
151 72 N.J. at 537, 371 A.2d at 1219.
152 See id. at 537-38, 371 A.2d at 1219-20. This of course raises questions as to the
appropriateness of ten "regions" consisting of single counties as determined by the
Division of State and Regional Planning. NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF STATE AND REGIONAL PLANNING, A STATEWIDE HOUSING ALLOCATION PLAN FOR NEW JERSEY 10

(Preliminary Draft) (Nov. 1976) [hereinafter cited as STATEWIDE HOUSING ALLOCATION PLAN]. Those single-county regions are listed as: Atlantic, Cape May, Cumberland,
Hunterdon, Mercer, Monmouth, Ocean, Salem, Sussex and Warren. Id.
'5' In order to remain consistent with a previous statement in the preliminary considerations section that specific designation of region and fair share are not required, 72
N.J. at 498-99, 371 A.2d at 1200, the court's general considerations, id. at 531-44, 371
A.2d at 1216-23, must be viewed merely as broad suggestions.
I- Id. at 537-41, 371 A.2d at 1219-22.
155 Id. at 537-38, 371 A.2d at 1220. The Statewide Housing Allocation Plan of the
Division of State and Regional Planning, see note 152 supra, is not to be accorded the
status of prima facie acceptability since it is still in the preliminary stage. 72 N.J. at 538,
n. 43, 371 A.2d at 1220.
156 72 N.J. at 538, 371 A.2d at 1220. Here, too, the court refused to establish an
absolute guide. The wording is that such regions "conceivably might" be acceptable.
Id. (emphasis added).
157 Id. at 538-39, 371 A.2d at 1220. This is consistent with the basic premise that the
problem is best dealt with legislatively or administratively. See id. at 534, 371 A.2d at
1218.
158 See id. at 539, 371 A.2d at 1221. Examples of the type of region that would be
favored include the five county region established by the Miami Valley (Dayton, Ohio)
Regional Planning Commission, the fifteen county region comprising the Metropolitan
Washington Council of Governments, and the seven county area covered by the Metropolitan Council of the Twin Cities (Minneapolis-St. Paul). Id., 371 A.2d at 1220-21.
159 Id., 371 A.2d at 1221 (emphasis in original).
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would be roughly equivalent to "the relevant housing market
area. "160
Once a valid region is determined, there remains the problem
of allocating a fair share of that region's need for lower income
housing.' 1 ' The court acknowledged that, in some respects, this
poses an even greater problem than the initial determination of
region. 16 2 Primarily, this is due to the fact that there is a greater
variety in the approaches which experts have used in calculating "fair
share."' 163 The court emphasized this point to buttress its view that
the problem should be dealt with legislatively and administratively
-not judicially. 164 Thus, the only guideline offered concerning fair
share was the broad proposition that once the appropriate region is
determined, an allocation of low and moderate income housing which
"correspond[s] at least roughly"'165 with the existing proportion of
low
and moderate income families in the region "would appear prima
166
facie fair."
Even when measured against these broad guidelines, the fair
share approach urged in defense of Madison Township's ordinance
was found to be seriously inadequate. The township had relied upon
two housing allocation studies, both of which utilized Middlesex
County as the appropriate region. 16 7 Although the experts arrived at
160 Id.

161Id.

at 540, 371 A.2d at 1221.
at 541, 371 A.2d at 1222. One author expected that the court would decide

the important question of the determination of fair share in the Madison Township case.
D. MOSKOWITZ, supra note 1, at 307. However, whatever further affirmative judicial
action was foreshadowed by the Mount Laurel decision has not been realized.
162 72 N.J. at 541, 371 A.2d at 1222. The court states that "harm to the objective of
securing adequate opportunity for lower income housing is less likely from imperfect
allocation models than from undue restriction of the pertinent region." Id. Thus, the
apparent problem for the court was what to say at all about fair share.
163 Id. An allocation model adopted by New Jersey's Division of State and Regional
Planning was guided by two principles:
(1) the allocation should improve the present imbalance of responsibility for
meeting low-and moderate-income housing needs in a "fair share" manner, and
(2) the allocation should take into account the relative suitability or capability
of municipalities to assume more responsibility for providing low-and-moderateincome housing.
STATEWIDE HOUSING ALLOCATION PLAN, supra note 152, at 10-13.
164 72 N.J. at 541-42, 371 A.2d at 1222.
165Id. at 543, 371 A.2d at 1223 (emphasis added).
166Id. The wording of this "guideline" reaffirms the analysis that the court was
cautiously avoiding establishing any absolutes on this issue. See notes 146-50 supra
and accompanying text.
167 72 N.J. at 525, 371 A.2d at 1213-14. The first housing study was done by a
planner named Kim in 1972 for the Middlesex County Planning Board. Id., 371 A.2d at
1214. The second study was done in 1974 specifically for Madison Township by its
planning adviser, Abeles. Id.
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similar fair share estimates, the court found two basic flaws common
168
to both studies which precluded any justifiable reliance on them.
First, the use of Middlesex County as the relevant region was not
realistic. 1 69 As a result, any fair share determination based upon that
region would be inherently suspect. 170 An equally significant failure
on the part of both studies was the bias toward measuring the existing need for lower income housing rather than the prospective
need. 17 1 Obviously, this aspect of the studies precluded their use in
any attempt to measure Madison Township's continuing need for the
72
foreseeable future. 1
Remedy and Remand
The remand by the court basically did five things: it required the
trial court to give due consideration to environmental evidence offered in support of certain aspects of Madison Township's zoning
ordinance; 173 it declined to order affirmative action on the part of
168 Id.
at 525-31, 371 A.2d at 1213-16. The Kim study allocates 1,600 lower income
units as Madison's fair share as of 1975, while the Abeles study arrived at a figure of
1,800 units. Id. at 525, 371 A.2d at 1214. A study done by plaintiffs' planner allocated
3,000 units for the same time period. Id. at 526, 371 A.2d at 1214.
169 Id. at 528 & n.35, 531, 536, 371 A.2d at 1215, 1216, 1219. The court was receptive to the idea of aligning the relevant region with the "housing market area," which in
this case could place Madison in a region that "includes at least the seven northeastern
counties of New Jersey." Id. at 528 n.35, 371 A.2d at 1215. Presumably those counties
would be Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Middlesex, Morris, Passaic, and Union.
The court also takes notice of the fact that the Department of Community Affairs,
through its Division of State and Regional Planning, had issued a preliminary draft of
the Statewide Housing Allocation Plan. 72 N.J. at 528 & n.35, 371 A.2d at 1215. The
Division of State and Regional Planning places Middlesex County in a region containing Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Morris, Passaic, Somerset, and Union Counties. STATEWIDE HOUSING ALLOCATION PLAN, supra note 152, at 10. The plan bases the determination of appropriate region on several factors including the sharing of housing needs,
"'socio-economic interdependence," and data availability and reliability as to the first
two factors. Id. at 7-9. The undertaking of the allocation plan was authorized by Executive Order No. 35 (April 2, 1976) of Governor Brendan Byrne. See also 72 N.J. at
531-33 & n.3 7 , 371 A.2d at 1217.
170 See 72 N.J. at 531-36, 371 A.2d at 1216-19.
171 Id.
at 525-26, 529, 371 A.2d at 1214, 1216. In referring specifically to the Abeles
study, the court recognized that of the 1,784 lower income units assigned as Madison's
fair share, 1,394 represented the existing need in Madison alone. Id. at 529-30, 371 A.2d
at 1216. In addition, there was no projection of the lower income housing need beyond
1975. Id. at 525-26, 371 A.2d at 1214.
172 See id. at 525-26 & n.33, 371 A.2d at 1214.
173 Id.
at 545, 371 A.2d at 1224. Judge Furman had ruled that evidence as to environmental matters need not be considered since ample land was available to zone for
high density, low cost housing without disturbing ecologically sensitive areas. Oakwood
at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 128 N.J. Super. 438, 447, 320 A.2d 223,
227-28 (Law Div. 1974).

1977]

COMMENTS

Madison Township to actually build or subsidize housing; 1 74 it invalidated the zoning ordinance, but only insofar as it required modification "to create the opportunity for a fair and reasonable share of the
least cost housing needs of Madison's region"; 175 it directed the trial
court to supervise the revision of the zoning ordinance to insure
compliance with the order and indicated that the trial court could
retain experts to formulate a proper ordinance in the event the
township's revision was found inadequate; 17 6 it granted specific relief
to the corporate plaintiffs who owned vacant land in the township, by
ordering Madison Township to issue a permit for the construction of
the housing development proposed by the corporation with the express stipulation that a minimum of twenty percent of the units be
77
allocated to low or moderate income families.1
By granting affirmative relief to the corporate plaintiffs and by
directing judicial supervision of compliance with the remainder of the
order, the court went a step further than it had originally gone in
Mount Laurel.178 The court found this to be a reasonable step in light
of the settled state of the basic law and the protracted nature of the
litigation. 179 Thus, although the court clearly announced its intention
to refrain from imposing specific remedial plans in an area which
lends itself more appropriately to legislative solutions,' 80 it also made
clear by this order that the judiciary would continue to struggle toward acceptable solutions so long as these questions were presented
to it. '8 1
174 72 N.J. at 546-47, 371 A.2d at 1224-25.
175 Id. at 552-53, 371 A.2d at 1227-28.
176 Id.

at 553-54, 371 A.2d at 1227-28. This ruling went beyond Mount Laurel

where the court refused to order judicial supervision. See 67 N.J.

at 192, 336 A.2d

at 734.
177 72 N.J. at 548-51, 371 A.2d at 1226-27. The developer had represented in its
original plans that a minimum of 20% of the units constructed would be allocated to low

or moderate income families. Id. at 551, 371 A.2d at 1227.
178 Compare id. at 551, 552-54, 371 A.2d at 1226-28 with 67 N.J. at 192, 336 A.2d at
734. These aspects of the order were consistent with the Madison Towntship court's
attempt to provide a practical approach to the problem. The court's basis for this change
in position was a matter of policy:
Considerations bearing upon the public interest, justice to plaintiffs and efficient judicial administration preclude another generalized remand for another
unsupervised effort by the defendant to produce a satisfactory ordinance. The
focus of the judicial effort after six years of litigation must now be transferred
from theorizing over zoning to assurance of the zoning opportunity for production of least cost housing.
72 N.J. at 552-53, 371 A.2d at 1228.
179 See 72 N.J. at 552, 371 A.2d at 1227-28.
180 Id. at 498-500, 371 A.2d at 1200-01.
isS Id. at 535-36, 371 A.2d at 1219. The court took the position that

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8: 460

The Concurring and Dissenting Opinions

Four Justices filed separate opinions in the case. 182 In a lengthy
opinion, Justice Pashman concurred in the invalidation of the ordinance, but dissented as to the propriety and effectiveness of the remedies granted.' 8 3 He again urged the court to proceed "farther and
faster" in providing "powerful judicial antidotes" with which to combat exclusionary zoning.1 84 In his Mount Laurel opinion, Justice
Pashman had expressed concern that towns would not voluntarily
comply with the court's mandate absent judicial supervision.' 8 5 This
unless and until other appropriate governmental machinery is effectively
brought to bear the courts have no choice, when an ordinance is challenged on
Mount Laurel grounds, but to deal with this vital public welfare matter as effectively as is consistent with the limitations of the judicial process.

Id.
182 Separate opinions were filed by Justice Pashman, id. at 555-619, 371 A.2d at
1229-61 (concurring and dissenting); Justice Schreiber, id. at 619-23, 371 A.2d at 126163 (concurring and dissenting); Justice Mountain, id. at 623-31, 371 A.2d at 1263-67
(concurring and dissenting); and Justice Clifford, id. at 631-38, 371 A.2d at 1267-71 (concurring).
183 Id. at 555-56, 371 A.2d at 1229.
184 Id. at 556, 371 A.2d at 1229. This exhortation was similar to that given in his
Mount Laurel opinion. See 67 N.J. at 194, 336 A.2d at 736 (Pashman, J., concurring). For
samples of pro and con reactions to Justice Pashman's viewpoint, see Comment, supra
note 16, at 215-16 and Note, 74 MICH. L. REV., supra note 13, at 772-75.
Justice Pashman based this call for affirmative judicial intervention upon an
analysis of the "evils which the widespread practice of exclusionary zoning inflicts upon
the State." 72 N.J. at 556, 371 A.2d at 1229. Several of the direct effects of exclusionary
practices include exacerbation of the housing shortage; an undermining of efficient land
use; erection of barriers for low paid industrial workers who wish to reside in the towns
in which they work; and acceleration of the deterioration of our cities by building walls
around them "over which only the well-to-do can escape." Id. at 557-59, 371 A.2d at
1230-31.
185 See 67 N.J. at 193-95, 336 A.2d at 735-36. Justice Pashman elaborated on this
argument in his Madison Township opinion, where he pointed out that towns fear that
compliance with Mount Laurel will increase the demand for services without a comparable increase in revenues, thus putting upward pressure on the property tax. 72 N.J. at
561, 371 A.2d at 1232. This fear is the basis for "fiscal zoning" as discussed in the trial
court opinions. See Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super.
11, 18, 283 A.2d 353, 357 (Law Div. 1971); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of
Madison, 128 N.J. Super. 438, 446-47, 320 A.2d 223, 227 (Law Div. 1974). To this fear
there may be added "long-standing social and racial fears and prejudices." 72 N.J. at
562, 371 A.2d at 1232 (Pashman, J., concurring and dissenting). Given such circumstances, it is understandable that town officials who believe that courts will hesitate to
enforce Mount Laurel would rather take their chances with a law suit than act voluntarily. Id. at 563, 371 A.2d at 1233.
Justice Pashman also warned that failure to supervise compliance with court orders
would result in towns devising new methods, not previously ruled upon, to circumvent
the trial court's order. Id. at 564-65, 371 A.2d at 1234. See also Mytelka & Mytelka,
supra note 13, at 29-30.
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concern, the validity of which is demonstrated by the protracted nature of the litigation in the Madison Township case, became the basis
for the proposal of detailed guidelines to "fuel the judicial imagination."' 8 6 Justice Pashman therefore set forth with great specificity the
remedies which he felt would guarantee protection of the plaintiff's
rights.18 7 He criticized the majority for stopping short of mandating a
specific means of determining "fair share" and "region,"' 18 8 since
without such calculations, there is no way for the court to measure
compliance with its order. 189
As an integral part of his position, Justice Pashman proposed various positive actions which the court could utilize to insure actual
relief. 190 Among the remedies suggested were such drastic steps as
186 72 N.J. at 576, 371 A.2d at 1240 (Pashman, J., concurring and dissenting). The
objectives of the judicial remedies were stated to be: 1) to prohibit exclusionary abuses
of the zoning power; 2) to provide a remedy for past zoning discrimination; 3) to maintain the attractiveness of the township as a place to live; 4) to "respect the principle of
local prerogative in land use planning"; and 5) to order "judicially manageable" relief.
Id. at 577-81, 371 A.2d at 1240-42.
The procedure to be used in reaching these objectives is identical to that which
Justice Pashman had set forth in his Mount Laurel opinion. See note 49 supra. However, he further suggested that all municipalities in the relevant region be required to
conduct a study of the housing needs in their region and to formulate specific fair
shares. 72 N.J. at 583, 371 A.2d at 1243. The trial court should then have the power,
based upon this formulation, to order the defendant municipality to draft a program
which would meet its obligations under the regional plan. If the program proved inadequate, the trial court should be empowered to impose appropriate modifications and
order their implementation. Id. at 584-85, 371 A.2d at 1244. See also Mytelka &
Mytelka, supra note 13, at 26-29.
187 72 N.J. at 582-616, 371 A.2d at 1243-60 (Pashman, J., concurring and dissenting).
188 Id. at 589-95, 371 A.2d at 1246-49. The Justice stated:
I am baffled by the majority's pronouncement that, while Madison Township
is obligated to create the opportunity for a fair and reasonable share of the housing needs of its region, "no formulaic determination or numerical specification
of such a fair and reasonable share is required." . . . Because this approach gives
the trial court no reliable way of measuring local compliance with the Court's
remedial order, I fail to see how it will encourage implementation of an effective remedial plan.
Id. at 589, 371 A.2d at 1246 (citation omitted) (quoting id. at 553, 371 A.2d at 1228).
In determining a municipality's fair share, Justice Pashman would have the trial
court consider factors such as the amount of vacant, developable land within the town
vis-ia-vis the region; the suitability of the land for lower income developments, considering access to transportation and utilities; availability of employment; the population density of the town as compared to that of the region; and the extent to which the town has
accepted or avoided its obligations under Mount Laurel. Based upon these factors, the
trial court should fix a specific number of units as the municipality's fair share. Id. at
594-95, 371 A.2d at 1249.
189 Id. at 589-90, 371 A.2d at 1246. He also suggested, however, that the trial court
judge should determine how much weight is to be given to each of the various factors.
Id. at 595, 371 A.2d at 1249.
190 Id. at 595-616, 371 A.2d at 1249-60. The danger in not awarding specific relief is
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enjoining approval of any type of development in the municipality
until provisions have been made for lower income housing; 19 1 ordering the municipality to adopt inclusionary zoning provisions; 19 2 and
requiring that the local governing body form a municipal housing authority to fund or construct low income housing. 19 3 Justice Pashman
concluded that, it is only through the use of "such direct and forceful
action,"' 19 4 that any progress will be made in putting an end to "the
195
barriers of exclusionary zoning."'
The opinions of Justices Schreiber, Mountain and Clifford are
helpful in deciphering the significance of the case. The fact that all
three Justices highlight the complexity of constructing judicial remedies in exclusionary zoning cases 196 is indicative of the practical

problem the court faced. The three opinions also echo the majority
position that the final solution to the problem is best handled legislatively. 197
The remarks of Justice Schreiber pinpoint the difficulty incisively
-"the wrong condemned in Mt. Laurel" can only be remedied by
striking at the underlying causes: decaying cities and a statewide tax
structure which relies primarily on the local property tax. 19 8 Justice
that plaintiffs achieve only a hollow victory. Cf. Mytelka & Mytelka, supra note 13, at 6
(suggesting that if courts do not act quickly, actual relief is nil). One commentator has
stated that
[t]he mere judicial enunciation of general principles and the reliance on municipal initiative to achieve compliance are not likely to lead to more than token
steps and thus will not result in the construction of more than a token amount
of the housing that is, after all, the object of this sound and fury.
Mallach, supra note 13, at 666.
191 72 N.J. at 610-11, 371 A.2d at 1257.
192Id. at 612-14, 371 A.2d at 1258-59.
193 Id. at 615-16, 371 A.2d at 1259-60.
194 Id. at 619, 371 A.2d at 1261.
195 Id.
196 See id. at 621, 371 A.2d at 1261 (Schreiber, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); id. at 623-24, 371 A.2d at 1263-64 (Mountain, J., concurring and dissenting);
and id. at 631, 371 A.2d at 1268 (Clifford, J., concurring).
197 Id. at 621-22, 371 A.2d at 1262 (Schreiber, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); id. at 624, 371 A.2d at 1264 (Mountain, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at
632, 371 A.2d at 1268 (Clifford, J., concurring).
198 Id. at 619-21, 371 A.2d at 1261-62 (Schreiber, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Schreiber noted that "[tihe underlying cause of this state of affairs is
New Jersey's tax structure, essentially local in nature, which generates most of its revenues from real estate assessments." Id. at 619, 371 A.2d at 1261. It is also significant
to note, as pointed out by Justice Schreiber, that in terms of the approach to exclusionary zoning litigation
[n]o party in th[eI proceedings has advocated that the judicial remedy be directed toward elimination of the causes. Instead efforts, following the lead of
Mt. Laurel, have been directed toward the amelioration or elimination of the
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Mountain, for his part, cautioned that the court should be careful not
to assume, by its activist approach to zoning cases, a role that has
traditionally belonged to an elected branch of government. 199 He
suggested that the problem would be better dealt with by a legisla20 0
tively established statewide agency to oversee land use regulation.
However, he did admit that any attempt to introduce some form of
20 1
statewide zoning agency would "provoke immediate opposition.Justice Clifford agreed with Justice Mountain that "the judiciary's
'power of legitimacy' "202 might not survive repeated forays into areas
"better and more effectively dealt with elsewhere. " ' 20 3 He recognized
that judicial solutions may be "neither entirely satisfactory nor wholly
successful." 20 4 However, he viewed this infirmity as a "by-product of

result, namely modification of the exclusionary provisions of the zoning ordinance.
Id. at 621, 371 A.2d at 1262 (emphasis added).
199Id. at 627, 371 A.2d at 1266 (Mountain, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice
Mountain's basic thesis is "that the solutions of these problems, individually and in the
aggregate, will be far more speedily and effectively devised by the Legislature than by
the courts." Id. at 624, 371 A.2d at 1264.
200 Id. at 627, 371 A.2d at 1266. Justice Mountain stated that any official agency
legislatively established to oversee statewide land use regulation would be able to survey the nature of exclusionary zoning problems in depth and consult with appropriate
experts in devising solutions. Id.
Justice Mountain characterized as a weakness in the majority position the fact that
"perhaps somewhat naively, it places . . . undue reliance upon good faith effort, despite
the fact that, for understandable if not laudable reasons, any such effort has thus far
been conspicuous by its almost total absence." Id. at 625, 371 A.2d at 1264. He immediately added to this the admission that "there is probably nothing better to offer as a
judicially devised alternative." Id.
201 Id. at 629-30, 371 A.2d at 1267.
202 Id. at 635, 371 A.2d at 1270 (Clifford, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 628, 371 A.2d
at 1266 (Mountain, J., concurring and dissenting)).
203 Id. at 635, 371 A.2d at 1270 (Clifford, J., concurring). Justice Clifford distilled
from all of the other opinions the sentiment that the ultimate solution to the causes of
exclusionary zoning must be a legislative one, and characterized the decision as being
"not at all in any spirit of twitting the legislature but of something between entreaty and
persuasion." Id. at 632, 371 A.2d at 1268.
The Justice's remarks uncover yet another problem arising from the onslaught of
exclusionary zoning litigation.
Recognizing the difference between what should come to the courts and
what should be dealt with by other institutions is a difficult enough exercise in
the abstract; but striking that balance in practice and then maintaining it seems
as much to elude our powers of management as those of our co-ordinate
branches of government. The spectrum of views expressed by my colleagues
demonstrates that disagreement on this fundamental problem underlies at least
part of today's division of the Court.
id.
204 Id. at 631, 371 A.2d at 1267-68.
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the judicial function being called upon to solve the extraordinarily
2 °5
complex problems underlying th[e] litigation.CONCLUSION

The language and tone of all of the opinions in the Madison
Township case attest to the fact that there is basic solidarity on one
point: the problems posed by exclusionary zoning are inherently complex and are difficult to resolve within the framework of an adversary
proceeding. Almost by definition, the underlying issues of local land
use control and the nature of New Jersey's tax structure must be dealt
with in any attempt to resolve the exclusionary zoning dilemma.
Viewed from this perspective, therefore, the task of any court faced
with the difficulty of providing practical remedies is additionally
complicated by the problem of the proper bounds of judicial restraint.
There is no doubt that the majority opinion recognized these
complexities. The court attempted to maintain the basic principles
enunciated in Mount Laurel while adjusting the remedy to meet
practical realities. By so doing, the court has apparently kept open the
possibility that in future cases remedies may again be adjusted if the
circumstances so demand. Such a reading of the case is wholly consistent with the overall evolving approach the New Jersey supreme
court has taken in zoning litigation. In addition, it holds the promise
that plaintiffs in zoning cases may indeed see more specific remedies
awarded if there is a continuing failure to find appropriate relief elsewhere.
Robert W. McAndrew
205 Id. (emphasis in original). Justice Clifford voted with the majority on the basis
that it "represent[ed] the best judicial accommodation of the present controversy to
Mount Laurel's essential principles." Id. at 638, 371 A.2d at 1271 (emphasis added).

